01:11:11
everchange000:matrix.org:
@riekak:matrix.org: Monero is going up.
01:11:55
everchange000:matrix.org:
If I had more cash, I'd buy the dip.
01:46:35
noperabo:matrix.org:
cap
05:18:12
snifflz1:matrix.org:
yo
05:18:35
plaiwanone:matrix.org:
gm
05:18:43
snifflz1:matrix.org:
gm
05:22:57
snifflz1:matrix.org:
where can I download the ban list at
05:36:19
321bob321:
@snifflz1:matrix.org: https://github.com/Boog900/monero-ban-list/blob/main/ban_list.txt
05:36:29
pyratevevo:matrix.org:
@snifflz1:matrix.org: https://github.com/Boog900/monero-ban-list
05:48:04
snifflz1:matrix.org:
thanks. all good now
05:56:58
kiersten5821:matrix.org:
what does this ban list even do, is this useless if i have tx-proxy option?
06:03:46
DataHoarder:
not peering with them also helps other users
15:09:20
kiersten5821:matrix.org:
how?
16:13:14
lza_menace:
@kiersten5821:matrix.org: The nodes in the ban list have proven to be untrustworthy. By using it your node will not communicate with them and as a result not share them with other nodes. It’s keeping the overall network safer to a degree.
18:18:48
kiersten5821:matrix.org:
if i have a synced daemon on one computer can i literally just copy the lmdb files over to a new computer to get the daemon there?
18:19:35
intr:unredacted.org:
if you first gracefully stop the daemon before copying
18:19:46
intr:unredacted.org:
should work
18:19:47
kiersten5821:matrix.org:
ok nice thanks
18:22:07
kiersten5821:matrix.org:
let's say i restore a wallet from a certain height, if i use a remote node, does my node need to download ALL block contents from that height until now so it can scan the entire output set for owned outputs?
18:22:34
kiersten5821:matrix.org:
my understanding is this is the case but idk if there were any improvements?
18:22:54
sbt:nope.chat:
@lza_menace: Isn't it also advantageous to malicious node operators, since they know and will try to avoid all the "signature detection"
18:36:22
rbrunner7:
This is going on for a long time already, and they don't seem to be in a hurry to hide better. They also could improve the distribution of the nodes regarding IP numbers so it would be harder to filter them out with simple measures, but it seems they choose not to. Who knows, maybe the whole story is not that important for them. Or they are operating on a pretty tight budget.
18:37:24
rbrunner7:
We can dream up all kinds of scenarios where the NSA joins forces with the FSB to attack Monero with secret quantum computers, but reality often is a lot more boring :)
18:47:28
mlxdy:
Hii!!!!
18:49:16
mlxdy:
I'm looking for safe way to store my cryptocurrency. I had Ledger wallet but it's not safe as company can extract seed phrase from device easily. For right now I have TailsOS which I'm using to store and access my btc
18:50:24
mlxdy:
With Monero I would like to host maybe local node. Of course I could just install Monero wallet on my machine, but I'm looking for safer way
18:52:55
mlxdy:
I was thinking about Trezor but it's also relying on some stupid electron app
18:53:50
Cindy:
mlxdy: trezor is open hardware though
18:54:01
Cindy:
and open source too on the firmware and API side
18:54:54
Cindy:
actually wait
18:55:10
Cindy:
nvm i don't think they're open hardware
18:55:23
ravfx:xmr.mx:
When OVK?
18:55:23
ravfx:xmr.mx:
So I don't have to leave my hardware wallet connected and unlocked until it get one confirmation (Or having to unlock it again when it get confirmed)
18:55:32
ravfx:xmr.mx:
I tought Trezor where open to some point
18:56:47
Cindy:
how easy is it to make your own hardware wallet
18:57:48
Cindy:
shove everything into a microcontroller (no external chips to reduce the chance of bus sniffing)
18:58:19
Cindy:
have protection against voltage glitching or any methods to trick the chip into unlocking protections and allowing access to internal data
18:58:26
nioc:
some new trezor models have issues when being used with monero
18:58:40
nioc:
not a monero issue as older moldels work fine
18:58:42
Cindy:
ravfx: soon hopefully
18:58:48
Cindy:
and hell, if it doesn't come with the hard fork
18:58:55
Cindy:
i'll make a carrot wallet myself anyway
18:58:56
nioc:
*models
18:59:15
mlxdy:
So how are you storing your monero? (if you can say of course)
18:59:31
ravfx:xmr.mx:
Good question. > <Cindy> shove everything into a microcontroller (no external chips to reduce the chance of bus sniffing)
18:59:31
ravfx:xmr.mx:
You would need some controller that is not vulnerable to getting raped by people who know how...
19:00:43
ravfx:xmr.mx:
It's probably why they all use "secure enclave" things
19:00:43
ravfx:xmr.mx:
Maybe make your wallet like some old arcade cartridge, store everything battery backuped SRAM. Make it so if the casing get tempered with, it cut the power and SRAM go byebye
19:01:31
nioc:
depends on your level of paranoia, you can create a wallet while offline and later send to it
19:01:43
ravfx:xmr.mx:
Use some Lithium 18600 cells or something with a charge controller so it charge when you plug it usb. But it's not used for anything but SRAM power
19:01:56
nioc:
just because your paranoid doesn't mean that are not after you :)
19:02:18
nioc:
write down your seed and store it somewhere safe
19:02:43
nioc:
write it down again and put it somewhere else
19:02:54
nioc:
hey, why not a third time
19:03:09
ravfx:xmr.mx:
Just put it in plain sight so no one can find it
19:03:33
nioc:
HW wallets are good if you want to transact and unsure of the security of the device you are using
19:03:53
mlxdy:
I'm not sure about security of my Ledger device haha
19:03:56
DataHoarder:
ravfx:xmr.mx: you can get normal view keys out if you modify the cli to print them :P
19:04:08
DataHoarder:
with that you can make a view wallet
19:04:33
DataHoarder:
but yeah. you can't export key images so it's useless except for seeing the confirmations
19:05:12
mlxdy:
Maybe I'll generate new seed offline in ledger live and I'll only download neccesary software like Monero etc. and then just I'll by using it with third party software
19:05:21
mlxdy:
This Ledger Live application is what I hate the most
19:06:01
mlxdy:
It have a lot of annoying popups and they try to sell their service for storing seed phrase online
19:06:33
nioc:
storing seeds as a service lolol
19:07:29
mlxdy:
yes xD
19:07:42
mlxdy:
and in their app there's ads of it everywhere
19:07:56
mlxdy:
they offering you free trial hahaha
19:08:16
nioc:
first one is free, sounds like drugs
19:08:25
mlxdy:
I'm dying from laugh when I think about this
19:09:13
mlxdy:
And in terms of service there's information that they can share that seed phrase with goverment
19:09:21
nioc:
0_o
19:09:43
nioc:
at least they say so
19:10:25
mlxdy:
It's sad that without KYC is impossible to buy crypto at normal prices
19:10:42
mlxdy:
I can't pass KYC as I'm not 18
19:10:55
mlxdy:
Of course in few months it will change
19:11:13
mlxdy:
I remember that in the past we had local monero
19:12:37
ravfx:xmr.mx:
DataHoarder: does not work with normal current view keys, you still need the hardware wallet to generate the key images
19:12:53
DataHoarder:
20:05:27 <DataHoarder> but yeah. you can't export key images so it's useless except for seeing the confirmations
19:12:58
DataHoarder:
you don't need the key images to view incoming :P
19:13:12
nioc:
not the same but there is haveno with the network using haveno being called retoswap
19:13:15
nioc:
which you may know of as you said "It's sad that without KYC is impossible to buy crypto at normal prices"
19:14:17
ravfx:xmr.mx:
I very rarely use the ledger live thing. It's only to upgrade the firmware or monero app > <mlxdy> It have a lot of annoying popups and they try to sell their service for storing seed phrase online
19:16:58
ravfx:xmr.mx:
Ledger have to continue to make money once the crypto hype is gone
19:20:00
mlxdy:
And goverment have to continiue to control their citizens
19:20:35
mlxdy:
RavFX: have you tried to use Ledger as FIDO key?
19:21:13
ravfx:xmr.mx:
mlxdy: Yeah, it just work
19:21:13
ravfx:xmr.mx:
And I don't have to buy 3 to have proper backups 😂
19:21:44
ravfx:xmr.mx:
The seed backup the FIDO key too
19:22:02
mlxdy:
Okay so what if you'll lose your ledger?
19:22:34
ravfx:xmr.mx:
mlxdy: I throw some monero dust at Amazon and get a new one?
19:22:34
ravfx:xmr.mx:
Ledger Nano S are cheap anyway
19:22:54
ravfx:xmr.mx:
Small, easy to hide...
19:23:18
ravfx:xmr.mx:
I have no idea why people want to one with big screen, Stax or something like that.. At that point it's when it become a toy
19:25:43
mlxdy:
I've seen that, is fucking joke. It's not even normal screen but like these in Kindles haha
19:26:18
ravfx:xmr.mx:
I never lost a ledger, no idea why people do that too.
19:26:19
ravfx:xmr.mx:
I did damage a ledger one time (don't use it as a finger fidget... Ledger meeting a computer screen at very high velocity can damage it 😂)
19:26:42
mlxdy:
haha
19:27:21
ravfx:xmr.mx:
mlxdy: Yeah, totally useless imo
19:27:36
ravfx:xmr.mx:
I think it's so you can view your -99% NFT or something
19:28:49
Cindy:
ravfx: were you referring to the capcom suicide batteries?
19:30:26
ravfx:xmr.mx:
Cindy: Yeah
19:30:27
ravfx:xmr.mx:
But good lithium batteries are reliable now, if it's to power only sram it should last forever assuming you plug it frmm time to time
19:31:03
ravfx:xmr.mx:
Maybe add extra light sensor circuit that also cut the juice to the sram, so if the person manage to open it without triggering the trap, then you have a backup trap
19:31:38
ravfx:xmr.mx:
I wonder if one can get a chinese to make case that embdeeb micro metal wire all around inside the plastic
19:32:26
Cindy:
why not just sniff the bus while the device is running
19:33:46
ravfx:xmr.mx:
Cindy: Because the private spend key won't leave the device. so you can't spy on it from USB.
19:33:46
ravfx:xmr.mx:
And if you want to dig inside to reach it's actual memory bus then at that point you will have triggered the battery trap
19:33:59
Cindy:
capcom actually had motorola produce them a special kind of 68000 that would decrypt data after fetching them from the bus
19:34:25
ravfx:xmr.mx:
Yeah, you can encrypt the ram and have your controller do all the encryption work too
19:34:48
ravfx:xmr.mx:
and if you like have the usb data link encrypted too
19:34:59
Cindy:
yeah like that
19:35:22
Cindy:
nothing wrong with being extra careful
19:35:27
ravfx:xmr.mx:
indeed
19:36:41
Cindy:
but are there any actual secure MCUs
19:36:55
Cindy:
like ones that aren't vulnerable to being tortured
19:37:04
ravfx:xmr.mx:
Ah yeah, there many option
19:37:48
ravfx:xmr.mx:
That hardest part might or might not be to implement the monero signing stuff. Have to do some math :) I should take a look at making my own signer, one day
19:38:18
ravfx:xmr.mx:
Cindy: YEah, extra protection.
19:38:18
ravfx:xmr.mx:
If someone manage to reach it without triggering any traps
19:38:39
Cindy:
ideally everything should be within the chip, like those TPMs
19:39:32
ravfx:xmr.mx:
If you can find one that have sram that would be ideal
19:40:38
ravfx:xmr.mx:
But yeah the secure mcu stuff are what's in Ledger and Trezors
19:41:27
DataHoarder:
20:22:57 <mlxdy> Okay so what if you'll lose your ledger?
19:41:29
DataHoarder:
did you backup seed words? :P
19:41:41
DataHoarder:
you can restore (or even use offline tools to generate the paths) and recover all material
19:41:44
Cindy:
the problem with secure MCUs is voltage glitching
19:41:58
Cindy:
ive heard of the STM32's read out protection being bypassed by just fucking with the power source
19:42:08
DataHoarder:
> stm32 > secure
19:42:15
ravfx:xmr.mx:
DataHoarder: Yeah, you can convert LEdger 24 words to Monero 25 words and just pluck it in Feather. Like in an emergency or something
19:42:32
DataHoarder:
they usually are external secure coprocessors
19:42:38
ravfx:xmr.mx:
Cindy: yeah, initial Trezor key leaking bug
19:43:00
ravfx:xmr.mx:
It's why you want the data stored in sram and have trap to erase it.
19:43:02
DataHoarder:
but it's becoming even better nowadays Cindy you can laser etch and do laser faults
19:44:14
Cindy:
ideally i'd want a fuse in the chip to get blown and permanently brick it if the voltage gets fucked with too much
19:44:31
Cindy:
i've seen that before i think
19:45:19
Cindy:
i'd rather want the hardware signer to die than to spill its secrets and live
19:45:50
ravfx:xmr.mx:
Have a boot counter in the code, that save in sram too.
19:45:50
ravfx:xmr.mx:
And have the usb power to be stabilitzed by the voltage regulator (the same that charge the battery)
19:46:15
DataHoarder:
they can unsolder it
19:46:18
ravfx:xmr.mx:
Actually save the boot counter in the internet eeprom
19:46:24
ravfx:xmr.mx:
internal eeprom**
19:46:28
DataHoarder:
:P
19:46:30
DataHoarder:
internet eeprom LOL
19:47:10
ravfx:xmr.mx:
That way if they can manage to open it without traping the traps, and power glitch it (rebooting it in the same process), boot counter will be more than 1, if boot counter > 1, blow the fuses
19:47:35
ravfx:xmr.mx:
It should never boot more than one time thanks to the nice lithium batteries
19:47:37
DataHoarder:
you can have this same issues on normal setups btw :P
19:47:38
Cindy:
so microcontroller will always be running?
19:47:49
DataHoarder:
^ sram like some bank tokens
19:47:52
ravfx:xmr.mx:
yes
19:48:27
ravfx:xmr.mx:
sram because it's don't really use power when idle.
19:48:27
ravfx:xmr.mx:
And there not vulnerable to cold boot attack
19:48:39
ravfx:xmr.mx:
once it lost power, all the transistor instantly unlatch
19:51:45
ravfx:xmr.mx:
microcontrollers probably have sleep modes too when not running.
19:51:46
ravfx:xmr.mx:
Would have to check there power consumption when idle and size the battery appropriatly (maybe so it last 3 months would be ideal).
19:51:46
ravfx:xmr.mx:
If only power the sram it would last years
19:53:46
Cindy:
also i thought SRAM was expensive
19:53:54
Cindy:
more expensive than DRAM
19:54:01
Cindy:
at least
19:55:03
ravfx:xmr.mx:
It's not like you need a lot of ram
19:55:03
ravfx:xmr.mx:
Don't you have a bucket of 486 cache chips somewhere or something?
19:55:03
ravfx:xmr.mx:
That's 32K, it's wayyyy too much for the need 😂
19:56:35
DataHoarder:
Cindy: it's expensive, but cpu caches are SRAM
19:57:05
DataHoarder:
and yeah. you just need a couple of bytes
19:58:18
Cindy:
also since the chip is external, wouldn't they be able to just, i dunno
19:58:29
Cindy:
unsolder the read/write pin and solder it permanently to be read?
19:59:21
Cindy:
by hooking it to ground?
20:00:14
ravfx:xmr.mx:
Cindy: That why the casing need to contain a trap, you know, so it lose power if you damage or open the case.
20:00:14
ravfx:xmr.mx:
Plus the SRAM you encrypt it, the key for it reside in the mcu
20:01:18
ravfx:xmr.mx:
And lets get real, most LE are arguably funny and will just crack it open and oops.
20:01:18
ravfx:xmr.mx:
Same for thiefs... Lets harvest the gold or something
20:01:39
DataHoarder:
not lose power btw
20:01:47
DataHoarder:
you need to flush, as it has data remanence
20:02:03
ravfx:xmr.mx:
DataHoarder: SRAM, not DRAM
20:02:07
DataHoarder:
SRAM
20:02:08
DataHoarder:
yes
20:02:12
DataHoarder:
it has data remanence
20:02:25
ravfx:xmr.mx:
For how long, considering it does not have the tiny capacitors...
20:02:34
DataHoarder:
https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/techreports/UCAM-CL-TR-536.html
20:02:36
DataHoarder:
even without power
20:02:39
DataHoarder:
DRAM needs the capacitors
20:02:43
321bob321:
EMP
20:03:09
DataHoarder:
this is from 2002
20:03:11
DataHoarder:
better attacks are done nowadays
20:04:47
DataHoarder:
so if you detect tamper cutting power is not enough, you should flush data first
20:06:04
DataHoarder:
and yeah, power bus issues :P https://cacm.acm.org/research-highlights/sram-has-no-chill-exploiting-power-domain-separation-to-steal-on-chip-secrets/
20:07:06
Cindy:
also btw
20:07:19
Cindy:
don't microcontrollers have a internal power-up counter register?
20:07:46
ravfx:xmr.mx:
Cindy: Some probably have yeah
20:08:17
ravfx:xmr.mx:
Research shows that SRAM can partially retain data for a few milliseconds under extremely low temperatures (below
20:08:58
DataHoarder:
minutes :P
20:09:28
DataHoarder:
modern research:
20:09:30
DataHoarder:
> Data retention in SRAM is also significantly increased with lowering the operation temperature of the SoC. Data may be retained for around 1 ½ hours at 75°C, 3 days at 50°C, nearly two months at 20°C, and approximately 3 years at 0°C.
20:09:37
DataHoarder:
note this is retaining specific bits, not entire content
20:10:35
ravfx:xmr.mx:
Your talking about a SOC, what about discreete SRAM chip?
20:10:44
DataHoarder:
similar numbers nowadays
20:11:13
DataHoarder:
see the first link
20:11:19
ravfx:xmr.mx:
This article introduces Volt Boot, a method for executing physical memory disclosure attacks on on-chip SRAM memories by exploiting SoCs’ power domain separation
20:11:30
ravfx:xmr.mx:
But if it's not in a SoC...
20:11:32
DataHoarder:
and the correlation to temperature
20:11:34
DataHoarder:
21:03:13 <DataHoarder> https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/techreports/UCAM-CL-TR-536.html
20:11:36
DataHoarder:
this is old research that looks at chips
20:11:45
DataHoarder:
but it's become worse since then
20:11:52
ravfx:xmr.mx:
On-chip memories, primarily SRAM, are integrated directly into the processor die, offering greater security against physical attacks (for example, probing attacks11,26) compared to off-chip memories. Research shows that SRAM can partially retain data for a few milliseconds under extremely low temperatures (below
20:11:52
ravfx:xmr.mx:
–
20:11:52
ravfx:xmr.mx:
110
20:11:52
ravfx:xmr.mx:
∘
20:11:53
ravfx:xmr.mx:
C[... more lines follow, see https://mrelay.p2pool.observer/e/je-i0OEKbmZvUFI5 ]
20:12:02
ravfx:xmr.mx:
That specific article seam to be for attacking SoC sram
20:12:33
ravfx:xmr.mx:
Chip are more godies inside, probably micro capacitors too, right?
20:12:36
DataHoarder:
see again the first link
20:12:38
DataHoarder:
which is attacking chips directly
20:12:40
DataHoarder:
no.
20:12:43
DataHoarder:
it's sram
20:12:46
DataHoarder:
it doesn't have micro capacitors
20:12:49
ravfx:xmr.mx:
They say SoC
20:13:15
DataHoarder:
open the FIRST link
20:13:17
DataHoarder:
21:12:23 <DataHoarder> 21:03:13 <DataHoarder> https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/techreports/UCAM-CL-TR-536.html
20:13:35
ravfx:xmr.mx:
Power domain separation. SoCs integrate numerous circuit blocks, each exhibiting unique analog characteristics. To meet stringent performance and power efficiency requirements, these blocks are divided into separate voltage domains. The power management unit (PMU) within the SoC dynamically manages the voltage levels for these domains at runtime, tailoring them to the workload of each domain.
20:13:36
ravfx:xmr.mx:
In modern, complex SoCs, dozens of off-chip supply pins connect to various power domains, enabling precise control over analog circuit behavior. This setup mitigates challenges such as ground bounce, power-supply noise, and per-pin current limitations. We broadly categorize the power-supply domains of an SoC into three main areas, as illustrated in Figure 2:
20:13:47
DataHoarder:
I linked that second one cause it was interesting while searching for papers that came from this
20:14:18
DataHoarder:
ravfx:xmr.mx: you are still reading the wrong paper
20:14:20
DataHoarder:
again open the first link
20:14:22
DataHoarder:
21:14:03 <DataHoarder> 21:12:23 <DataHoarder> 21:03:13 <DataHoarder> https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/techreports/UCAM-CL-TR-536.html
20:14:52
DataHoarder:
that has the PDF
20:15:20
DataHoarder:
> We built a special circuit board for testing static RAM chips.
20:15:22
DataHoarder:
they even list the models
20:15:51
DataHoarder:
it's 2003, and has become worse over time
20:17:20
Cindy:
is there a SoC that literally kills itself over voltage glitching
20:17:30
Cindy:
instead of handling it as a regular hardware fault
20:17:59
Cindy:
it's weird that MCU manufacturers haven't done this
20:18:15
DataHoarder:
yes, see rpi talk on recent ccc
20:18:45
DataHoarder:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hbFRnPNQnoY
20:18:47
DataHoarder:
this had fault detectors
20:18:49
ravfx:xmr.mx:
as far as cold attack on sram, you still need to reach the chip to freeze it.
20:18:50
ravfx:xmr.mx:
At that point there is nothing truly secure
20:19:18
DataHoarder:
and they go over how some were also bypassed by doing locality attacks
20:19:20
DataHoarder:
well yeah, ravfx:xmr.mx, that is the point
20:19:22
DataHoarder:
you need tamper detectors to cover this :P
20:19:52
DataHoarder:
wait Cindy
20:19:54
DataHoarder:
wrong talk
20:19:56
DataHoarder:
THIS is the one https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=V5KvW4elzXU
20:19:58
DataHoarder:
> 39C3 - Of Boot Vectors and Double Glitches: Bypassing RP2350's Secure Boot
20:20:00
DataHoarder:
https://media.ccc.de/v/39c3-of-boot-vectors-and-double-glitches-bypassing-rp2350-s-secure-boot
20:20:49
ravfx:xmr.mx:
YEah, the trap I mentionned about should cut the power when the casing is broken or open (micro wires embdeebed in the case, light sensor.
20:20:49
ravfx:xmr.mx:
Now would have to have also a temperature sensor that work with a different power source, that would write "random" all over the sram assuming it's getting cold
20:22:28
ravfx:xmr.mx:
Get a NEC D
20:22:38
ravfx:xmr.mx:
NEC D4364C :p
20:22:40
ravfx:xmr.mx:
https://mrelay.p2pool.observer/m/xmr.mx/epFasLlyHhklyvfAUKjcFzIb.png (clipboard.png)
20:23:32
ravfx:xmr.mx:
Anyway, assuming the sram is encrypted, it's just extra protection for the mcu. Just an extra anti tamper thing.
20:23:45
ravfx:xmr.mx:
more thing can break when you mess with it
20:23:46
DataHoarder:
then you read fuses from mcu to decrypt sram :P
20:24:01
DataHoarder:
you have all the time in the world
20:24:11
DataHoarder:
burning fuses takes relatively a lot of power, so you can't reliably burn these on the spot
20:26:26
ravfx:xmr.mx:
So what about, instead of cuting the power to the sram, what about writing just 1 or 0's in it?
20:26:26
ravfx:xmr.mx:
Cutting the power the moment the case is open
20:26:26
ravfx:xmr.mx:
writting 1's all over the moment the case is open/broken
20:28:23
ravfx:xmr.mx:
At an extra shenanigans that rely on some rf signal
20:28:23
ravfx:xmr.mx:
signal gone -> erase (like in an event the device is relocated)
20:28:23
ravfx:xmr.mx:
That way we can probably just use the mcu sram instead of having a dedicated chip.
20:29:19
ravfx:xmr.mx:
Or actually leave it on a seperate chip for more fun and shenanigans
20:29:29
ravfx:xmr.mx:
But normally people steal the stuff before cracking it apart
20:38:03
ravfx:xmr.mx:
ideally if someone want to make a custom hardware wallet, one could make it so it does not look like an hardware wallet or something weird .
20:38:04
ravfx:xmr.mx:
like some random idea
20:38:06
ravfx:xmr.mx:
https://mrelay.p2pool.observer/m/xmr.mx/hIqlmTFYiTZibrOPJUYPEqcc.png (clipboard.png)
20:38:15
ravfx:xmr.mx:
hidden in plein sight, on the fridge!
20:38:32
Cindy:
ravfx: cover the interior of the case with a magnetic strip
20:38:39
Cindy:
and then put magnetic sensors all over the board
20:38:40
ravfx:xmr.mx:
There plenty if space in that thing
20:39:45
ravfx:xmr.mx:
And if one day the thing that make bip bip on the fridge vanish, restore your keys and move the crypto to your backup 😂
20:40:41
ravfx:xmr.mx:
Cindy: Yeah, we could continue all day to try to add security measures
20:41:14
Cindy:
lol
20:41:19
Cindy:
or maybe just use a grapheneOS pixel
20:43:54
ravfx:xmr.mx:
not a phone
20:44:49
ravfx:xmr.mx:
thieve can be interessed into stealing it
20:44:49
ravfx:xmr.mx:
if you get raided by LE, they will also take it (they have a tendency of taking the connected computing stuff, phones and the weird stuff)
20:45:10
Cindy:
true
20:46:31
ravfx:xmr.mx:
At the end, the extra security measures wont be used if no one think it's interresting
20:47:24
Cindy:
throw your signer into space
20:47:32
Cindy:
and communicate over a satellite
20:47:50
Cindy:
nobody can go to space and get your signer
20:48:29
ravfx:xmr.mx:
Cindy: it's about 10K I think, launching a primitive small cube sat
20:49:00
ravfx:xmr.mx:
but then it's going to need to be registred and they will know where it is
20:49:29
Cindy:
also the internal components needs to be hardened against radition
20:49:44
Cindy:
radiation*
20:50:00
ravfx:xmr.mx:
yep, at the end it make a very expensive custom personal signer
20:50:11
ravfx:xmr.mx:
just leave the thing in plain sight, in the kitchen
20:57:04
DataHoarder:
21:49:54 <br-m> <ravfx:xmr.mx> but then it's going to need to be registred and they will know where it is
20:57:06
DataHoarder:
they also know where your butt is at all times :P