01:46:58
Guest0:
I'm reading about menro and this seems pretty concerning? https://monero.fail/opsec
01:47:18
Guest0:
bridges/swap services are the only realistic monero on-ramp. but once it gets deposited in your wallet with tainted metadata, what can you do? the page recommends using a third-party wallet... does the native monero wallet not offer this kind of mitigation?
01:48:52
lza_menace:
The recommendations include ways to mitigate the tainted coins. It’s only recommended because it’s more user friendly but it can certainly done in the native wallet.
01:49:42
lza_menace:
It’s not a big deal if you recycle addresses, and if you are receiving tiny amounts and suspected tainted coins, then churn them away a few times
01:49:58
sauer_ninja:matrix.org:
Menro
01:50:07
sauer_ninja:matrix.org:
Well they say water finds it's level
01:50:19
lza_menace:
Menro gud coin
01:50:51
sauer_ninja:matrix.org:
Very accessible
01:50:59
lza_menace:
Guest0: Tracing is only probabilistic so once you start churning you reduce the probability.
01:51:20
Guest0:
iza_menace is there a tutorial for how to do this in the official wallet? how come it's not implemented by default?
01:51:53
Guest0:
I feel I was kind of lucky to even find the page about this specific attack
01:52:36
Guest0:
I'd prefer to do this in the official wallet
01:52:41
lza_menace:
> <Guest0> bridges/swap services are the only realistic monero on-ramp. but once it gets deposited in your wallet with tainted metadata, what can you do? the page recommends using a third-party wallet... does the native monero wallet not offer this kind of mitigation?
01:52:41
lza_menace:
It’s not depositing into a wallet with tainted utxos, it’s when you send coins and those tainted utxos are involved. The recipient entity can do the probabilistic matching. IE becomes an issue when you are sending menro to an untrusted party and you potentially have tainted utxos
01:54:47
Guest0:
the problem is that brdiges are the only realistic on-ramp (for most users) and they taint their deposits. so it's 100% necessary when the user *starts* using monero to defend against this attack. or am I wrong?
01:54:51
lza_menace:
https://mrelay.p2pool.observer/m/monero.social/xofkGxuhcQzFnjKRCBvTMxcD.jpeg (0F826EA6-E238-4FD2-9407-1B648D447B38.jpeg)
01:54:55
lza_menace:
https://mrelay.p2pool.observer/m/monero.social/OWkiCZspVuZaWedhXODFzIQv.jpeg (6ABB602C-E19D-44B1-B090-A143B51AA16E.jpeg)
01:54:56
lza_menace:
It is implemented by default. > <Guest0> iza_menace is there a tutorial for how to do this in the official wallet? how come it's not implemented by default?
01:56:02
lza_menace:
Guest0: Recommended to churn by sending to yourself a few times if you’re worried about maximally protecting privacy
01:56:15
lza_menace:
You’re correct
01:56:24
Guest0:
ok so these are the wallet commands necessary to reproduce the recommendations on that page?
01:57:04
Guest0:
do I basically do sweep_all a few time to my own wallet?
01:58:07
lza_menace:
Yes. Using CLI
01:58:23
Guest0:
but if the deposit from the bridge is just one transaction, does this still help? since there is nothing to "consolidate", although it does trigger a new transaction, so I'm not sure whether it helps. does it make more sense to break the initial deposit into 2, so that there is something to consolidate?
02:01:02
lza_menace:
I think it’s less about consolidation and more adding additional ring members.
02:02:53
lza_menace:
I have a surface level understanding of the cryptography, but to reduce it, every transaction you’re mixing your utxo with 15 other dummy entries (ring members). If you send a tainted utxo to a malicious party they have a 1/16 chance of guessing which one belonged to you. If you send multiple times you now mix with N other ring members, decreasing the probability of their guess.
02:03:15
lza_menace:
Someone should fact check that but that’s my layman understanding
02:03:46
Guest0:
my understanding is that the metadata they taint the transactions with makes it possible to trace *that transaction* as it gets re-sent across the network. i.e to trace where it gets spent. so if you just send that same transaction to yourself, it can still be traced. but if you consolidate it with other transactions, then maybe the metadata get
02:03:47
Guest0:
mangled, or something...
02:04:42
jbabb:cypherstack.com:
sometimes I send small donations to any public address around just to spread outputs around
02:04:42
Guest0:
the only part I'm not sure about is the last sentence. but the rest is consistent with this video https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WkphgF6Hn4w
02:05:26
lza_menace:
Monero hides in the crowd, the more transactions, the larger the crowd
02:06:12
Guest0:
it's not that simple. this attack vector relies on mailicious public nodes that taint transactions with metadata which makes it traceable if you spend it later
02:06:57
Guest0:
they add some kind of fingerprint to it
02:07:10
jbabb:cypherstack.com:
you trust remote nodes with certain things
02:07:18
jbabb:cypherstack.com:
it's more that public nodes can keep logs
02:07:37
Guest0:
it's not about using public nodes, it's about using bridges. bridges do this too when they deposit to your wallet
02:08:06
jbabb:cypherstack.com:
what they can log is still limited though. it's not like you can find everything out about a remote wallet user... but you can find out some obvious things like ip sometimes
02:08:27
jbabb:cypherstack.com:
the bridges are create problems with their logs
02:08:36
Guest0:
you're referring to a different attack vector
02:08:42
jbabb:cypherstack.com:
it's the same issue
02:08:49
Guest0:
no, it's not
02:08:54
jbabb:cypherstack.com:
if you're swapping something, your peer gets some information
02:09:04
jbabb:cypherstack.com:
if you're using a light wallet, your peer gets some information
02:09:19
Guest0:
and the mitigations are different too. what you're talking about is solved by using a proxy, or Tor. it's unrelated
02:09:56
Guest0:
this is about decoy metadata used to taint transactions, that makes it possible to trace that transaction when it gets spent later
02:10:08
jbabb:cypherstack.com:
"decoy metadata" is nonsense
02:10:20
lza_menace:
DataHoarder[m]^
02:10:36
jbabb:cypherstack.com:
they're adding metadata to key images
02:10:47
jbabb:cypherstack.com:
tracking*--you can't add data to a key image on chain
02:11:08
Guest0:
I posted the sources earlier
02:11:59
jbabb:cypherstack.com:
yeah, the .fail ... it's the same class of problem as using a remote node
02:12:02
jbabb:cypherstack.com:
I disagree w your assessment there completely basically
02:13:33
jbabb:cypherstack.com:
or rather, it's the same in that the solution is to not engage with swaps or remote modes or not connect directly
02:14:14
jbabb:cypherstack.com:
nodes*. a malicious atomic swap provider can log some similar sorts of information
02:14:47
Guest0:
that's the same as saying the solution is not to use monero at all. DEX/bridges are the only available on-ramp for most users
02:15:13
jbabb:cypherstack.com:
or not connect directly
02:15:47
Guest0:
what does that mean? you need the bridge to make a deposit to your wallet. when the transaction arrives, it's tainted. what's the solution?
02:16:36
nioc:
<Guest0> it's not that simple. this attack vector relies on mailicious public nodes that taint transactions with metadata which makes it traceable if you spend it later <<>> Cat never uses a public node
02:16:36
jbabb:cypherstack.com:
well, churn, first of all
02:16:44
jbabb:cypherstack.com:
but it's up to you what information you reveal in that swap process
02:16:45
nioc:
why do you?
02:17:05
jbabb:cypherstack.com:
what swap service, did you use an account, did you connect clearnet, did you kyc
02:17:08
jbabb:cypherstack.com:
even then
02:17:12
jbabb:cypherstack.com:
what they can know is limited
02:17:16
Guest0:
nioc this isn't about using public nodes. it's about using bridges for the initial deposit and on-ramp
02:17:41
jbabb:cypherstack.com:
they can know if someone used their key image in a ring ... currently, that's changing soon ... but not if it was a decoy. they can't know where you spend it
02:17:42
Guest0:
jbabb again you're talking about unrelated attack vectors
02:17:45
DataHoarder[m]:
@lza_menace: Hmm? Context?
02:17:53
jbabb:cypherstack.com:
some attacks rely on tainting with multiple small outputs and recognizing when they're spent together
02:17:54
nioc:
big brains have studied churning and after that had no recommendations on how to churn properly
02:18:16
jbabb:cypherstack.com:
nah there's a protocol but it's basically to churn
02:21:40
nioc:
how about, when buying send to a wallet, then send to another wallet and throw away the first wallet
02:22:04
jbabb:cypherstack.com:
nioc: I don't think that's necessary if you just churn internal to a wallet
02:22:23
jbabb:cypherstack.com:
for extra paranoia use coin control and churn addresses individually before spending them together
02:22:39
nioc:
I was thinking also about addresses
02:23:02
jbabb:cypherstack.com:
some people increment subaddresses for every transaction
02:23:03
nioc:
yes I know, subaddresses :)
02:23:06
jbabb:cypherstack.com:
some people separate funds into accounts
02:23:12
jbabb:cypherstack.com:
some people move wallet to wallet
02:24:24
nioc:
I believe CLI doesn't have coin control
02:24:26
Guest0:
nioc if it's just 1 transaction you're moving around, I don't think it helps at all, because it retains the tainted metadata. that's how the attack works in the first place,the point is being able to trace that specific output as it gets spent later
02:24:42
jbabb:cypherstack.com:
Guest0: what tainted metadata?
02:25:08
jbabb:cypherstack.com:
sorry, earlier when I said "that's nonsense" I meant: I don't understand what you mean because this isn't the terminology I'm used to seeing
02:25:19
Guest0:
I posted the sources earlier
02:25:31
jbabb:cypherstack.com:
once you spend a key image and create a new one they can't know where that new one went
02:25:36
jbabb:cypherstack.com:
monero.fail.opsec?
02:26:15
jbabb:cypherstack.com:
a "tainted UTXO" isn't a real term: it's just a key image that they logged some information about
02:26:22
Guest0:
yes, but this explains it in more detail: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WkphgF6Hn4w
02:26:29
jbabb:cypherstack.com:
using it once basically breaks the link
02:27:23
Guest0:
ok, you know more than me about this. I'd appreciate if you watched that video and confirmed that we're talking about the same things and that I can use your recommendation
02:27:47
Guest0:
in the video they call it a decoy transaction output I think
02:27:55
jbabb:cypherstack.com:
ah yeah again, that article and that video aren't really in depth technical looks at how chainalysis works
02:28:18
jbabb:cypherstack.com:
so when you create a ringct tx, as people have pointed out above, you pick decoys and create an output: a "key image"
02:28:45
jbabb:cypherstack.com:
when a swap provider sends you your monero they can just keep track of whenever that is used in the future. now, any output can be selected randomly as a "decoy"
02:29:09
jbabb:cypherstack.com:
so even that they "know" it's spent is a little "bogus": it's probabilistic as mentioned above
02:29:26
jbabb:cypherstack.com:
they aren't adding info to the key image that then lives with it as it gets spent to create a new output/key image
02:30:04
jbabb:cypherstack.com:
they can kind of sort of guess that it might have been spent. and might have a higher probability of guessing right if you for example spent multiple outputs together in one tx together, part of that tainting attack mentioned
02:30:20
Guest0:
a probabilistic fingerprint it still concerning
02:30:25
jbabb:cypherstack.com:
you are partly right that they're different vectors than for example using a remote node or a light wallet
02:30:32
jbabb:cypherstack.com:
but the solution is still imo the same
02:31:15
Guest0:
wasn't your solution to not use a swap in the first palce?
02:31:30
jbabb:cypherstack.com:
I said "... or not connect directly"
02:31:40
jbabb:cypherstack.com:
that isn't a total "do not use swaps"
02:31:51
jbabb:cypherstack.com:
that is a "<do not use swaps or remote nodes> or connect directly"
02:31:56
Guest0:
and I asked what does it mean to "conenct directly" when you're using a swap to make the initial deposit to your wallet
02:32:18
jbabb:cypherstack.com:
I mean that you should think about what that swap provider can know
02:32:28
jbabb:cypherstack.com:
ip, certain wallet addresses (maybe on two chains)
02:32:39
jbabb:cypherstack.com:
do they have an account? do they kyc? etc., what all info CAN they know about you
02:32:51
Guest0:
it knows how to trace the transaction they sent, that's all that matters
02:33:23
jbabb:cypherstack.com:
if you post your address and I send a transaction to it and that key image I know about because I created it is spent quickly I can guess you spent it
02:33:27
jbabb:cypherstack.com:
but what all can I know about you?
02:33:32
jbabb:cypherstack.com:
I can google Guest0
02:33:43
jbabb:cypherstack.com:
if I ran the matrix server I might be able to maliciously log some ips on you
02:33:47
jbabb:cypherstack.com:
maybe your email address
02:34:11
Guest0:
ok I see. well since the other side of the swap exchange does not come from monero, then obviously it's not anonymous
02:34:28
jbabb:cypherstack.com:
not impossibly
02:34:41
Guest0:
for most users, that is going to be the case
02:35:11
Guest0:
it's most likely a bitcoin wallet funded using a centralised onramp
02:35:18
Guest0:
with KYC
02:35:25
jbabb:cypherstack.com:
I also wasn't precise with my output vs. key image terminology which I mixed up a bit
02:37:27
jbabb:cypherstack.com:
I used key image and output basically interchangeably and that's wrong. a swap provider in creating an output can see when that is used in the future but can't know whether it's a decoy or the "real spend"
02:37:47
Guest0:
the bridge and everything before it is not anonymised. and if it's and edge case where it's anonymised (e.g you minted bitcoin in 2010), then the use case for monero decreases anyway
02:38:09
jbabb:cypherstack.com:
whereas neither swap services/exchanges nor remote nodes create key images, sorry, those are created at spend
02:38:32
jbabb:cypherstack.com:
well, however you access whatever bridge, swap, exchange, etc., is up to you
02:39:18
Guest0:
it's important to assume that the bridge is not used anonymously, for this conversation to be helpful
02:39:48
jbabb:cypherstack.com:
that's dumb
02:39:54
jbabb:cypherstack.com:
use your bridge anonymously
02:40:01
jbabb:cypherstack.com:
why are you not using your bridge anonymously?
02:40:26
Guest0:
we're going in cricles
02:40:28
jbabb:cypherstack.com:
but no, you're right, you risk leaking information at basically every step
02:40:42
jbabb:cypherstack.com:
rings perhaps
02:43:07
jbabb:cypherstack.com:
menro stronk, not concerned > <Guest0> I'm reading about menro and this seems pretty concerning? https://monero.fail/opsec
02:43:19
jbabb:cypherstack.com:
git gud
02:43:57
jbabb:cypherstack.com:
no, sorry, again, that's rude of me, and a bit unhelpful to dismiss concerns
02:44:27
jbabb:cypherstack.com:
it's good you're thinking about the various ways in which users can have some of their privacy degraded and we have good news
02:48:42
Guest0:
based on the sources I've posted, it seems to me that the most effective way to mitigate this attack vector is to split the initial bridge deposit into multiple chunks, then either do a sweep_all once, or break it down into stages using the transfer command (using it with the specific transactions outputs). if anyone is familiar with this specific
02:48:42
Guest0:
attack vector, I want to know if this will be effective.
02:49:34
jbabb:cypherstack.com:
I wouldn't recommend splitting it into chunks then spending those separate chunks together
02:49:51
jbabb:cypherstack.com:
I would churn everything received as many times as you can afford to ... 2, 5, 10
02:49:52
Guest0:
jbabb please let other people answer now
02:49:56
jbabb:cypherstack.com:
before joining them together
02:49:59
jbabb:cypherstack.com:
if you use accounts
02:50:10
jbabb:cypherstack.com:
you can track how many times you're churned by the index of the subaddress
02:50:24
jbabb:cypherstack.com:
once you get to address 9 (or whatever) you can consolidate accounts together
02:51:34
jbabb:cypherstack.com:
splitting the initial "bridge deposit" and joining them together negates any benefit splitting would have which isn't necessarily going to help at all
02:51:53
jbabb:cypherstack.com:
splitting would necessitate churning before rejoining them
02:53:56
jbabb:cypherstack.com:
sorry, that last statement isn't exactly right either: it's more that if you split them up and join them together you're linking them again unless you do due diligence and churn
02:54:12
jbabb:cypherstack.com:
but no, avoid sweep_all
02:55:06
jbabb:cypherstack.com:
(and due diligence isn't JUST churning, it's also includes if you're using a light wallet server or remote node)
02:55:47
jbabb:cypherstack.com:
yes, use transfer and coin control, but also if you create distinct accounts for each service and sweep_all internal to that and churn it, that's better than combining things together without churning
02:56:41
jbabb:cypherstack.com:
so if Swap Service A creates a bunch of outputs and sends you a bunch of dust trying to track when you spend things together and you sweep it all together, well, you've broken the link in that one sweep and each churn adds chances that it's a decoy rather than a "true spend", basically
02:57:13
jbabb:cypherstack.com:
I generally don't recommend accounts because you can easily forget to activate accounts on restore later and they aren't widely supported, but all the official wallets do
02:57:56
jbabb:cypherstack.com:
Cake Wallet does tho iirc
02:58:18
jbabb:cypherstack.com:
I don't think they show the subaddress index you're at tho, do they?
03:00:40
jbabb:cypherstack.com:
so like let's say there's a ransomware group that's receiving monero and swapping it for btc then selling it on an exchange
03:00:50
jbabb:cypherstack.com:
or fill in the group
03:01:15
Guest0:
jesus you've just burried my question for a second time...
03:01:39
jbabb:cypherstack.com:
well, that's not the best example, because that's not exactly what your video or article were referencing
03:02:08
jbabb:cypherstack.com:
> based on the sources I've posted, it seems to me that the most effective way to mitigate this attack vector is to split the initial bridge deposit into multiple chunks, then either do a sweep_all once
03:02:08
jbabb:cypherstack.com:
no
03:02:27
jbabb:cypherstack.com:
> or break it down into stages using the transfer command
03:02:27
jbabb:cypherstack.com:
better but not always yes
03:02:48
Guest0:
which part of "let other people answer" was not clear?
03:03:14
jbabb:cypherstack.com:
alright so I have been thinking
03:03:25
jbabb:cypherstack.com:
about these seeeed formats
03:03:37
jbabb:cypherstack.com:
polyseed? yes, please! but I need more words
03:03:41
jbabb:cypherstack.com:
16 words is just not enough for my security needs
03:04:07
geonic:
logorrhea is a treatable condition
03:05:00
jbabb:cypherstack.com:
I won't be happy til we have at least kb addresses
03:05:52
jbabb:cypherstack.com:
also, new proposal: cut to doom and gloom, we're blooming, baby
03:06:58
jbabb:cypherstack.com:
I know nobody's brave enough to say it, but I will: Monero has the most welcoming and good natured community of any crypto online and the haters are gaslighting us that we have serious talent retention issues due to assholes
03:09:04
geonic:
btw, are you Diego’s brother? the ramblings and musings are similar
03:09:29
diego:cypherstack.com:
summoned by my lover again
03:09:51
jbabb:cypherstack.com:
are you Diego's brother and he appears
03:09:58
jbabb:cypherstack.com:
I hope that means yes 💓
03:10:07
jbabb:cypherstack.com:
sorry to shitpost on main boss...
03:13:18
jeffro256:
> <Guest0> based on the sources I've posted, it seems to me that the most effective way to mitigate this attack vector is to split the initial bridge deposit into multiple chunks, then either do a sweep_all once, or break it down into stages using the transfer command (using it with the specific transactions outputs). if anyone is familiar with this specific
03:13:19
jeffro256:
Plz don't do this, this is the worst possible thing you do can do to affect on-chain traceability
03:14:17
ofrnxmr:xmr.mx:
3/3 j.babb, j.effro and j.ofrn all agree
03:14:52
jbabb:cypherstack.com:
4 out of 5 menro users agree
03:15:15
jeffro256:
Maybe what could be worse is putting a PGP signature and SSN announcing that you are the spender of that tx
03:16:56
jeffro256:
If you must churn, do sweep_single's with long random delays b/t each step. NEVER EVER UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES RECOMBINE
03:19:33
snifflz1:matrix.org:
Yo
03:19:41
jbabb:cypherstack.com:
up above where I said each service / counterparty should get their own account: to be more accurate, I should say: each session should get its own account
03:19:41
jbabb:cypherstack.com:
so if you use Swap Service A in two sessions, you want to churn those outputs separately and not sweep_all them together
03:20:03
jbabb:cypherstack.com:
however, practically speaking, I just churn things a lot before joining outputs
03:20:45
jeffro256:
FWIW CLI, RPC, GUI, and Cake wallet all show subaddress indices > <@jbabb:cypherstack.com> I don't think they show the subaddress index you're at tho, do they?
03:21:14
jbabb:cypherstack.com:
nice, Cake Wallet. hope those stick around thru the redesign
03:21:15
jbabb:cypherstack.com:
accounts are helpful for me for tracking how churned an output from a session is
03:21:24
jbabb:cypherstack.com:
or rather, the subaddress index in an account
03:21:43
ofrnxmr:xmr.mx:
@jeffro256: Monfluo too
03:25:52
lza_menace:
@jeffro256: Oh, I usually just combine all into one output. This is not ideal?
03:26:07
lza_menace:
*why is it not ideal
03:26:48
ofrnxmr:xmr.mx:
@lza_menace: It is ideal if youre just cleasing a bunch on poison into a de-poisoned output
03:27:30
ofrnxmr:xmr.mx:
But counter-intuitive if you are actively acquiring 100 different inputs with a goal of gaining a privacy advantage
03:28:04
jbabb:cypherstack.com:
if someone knows about multiple outputs and have logged information / metadata about them and then you spend them together, that can link them
03:28:42
jeffro256:
@ofrnxmr:xmr.mx: ONLY if you know that the poisoned outputs are from the same person
03:29:10
jeffro256:
Its counterproductive if its from multiple entities
03:29:15
lza_menace:
@jbabb:cypherstack.com: But only on the first spend, not after consolidation / churning rounds?
03:29:57
jbabb:cypherstack.com:
their guess is less and less sure with each hop / churn
03:30:00
jbabb:cypherstack.com:
avoid consolidation
03:30:08
jbabb:cypherstack.com:
if you have to, be careful about it
03:30:22
ofrnxmr:xmr.mx:
@jeffro256: If its from multiple entities, its a matter of whether you are hiding that you own(ed) them all, or whether you are hiding ehere they are being spent
03:30:40
ofrnxmr:xmr.mx:
If the former, combinibg rhem will expose that one person owns them all
03:30:44
jeffro256:
This is a bit misleading because the new output is still poisoned because the poison collection tx is so traceable . so if you do this , you must also assume that the new one is poisoned and should churn it by itself > <@ofrnxmr:xmr.mx> It is ideal if youre just cleasing a bunch on poison into a de-poisoned output
03:31:02
jbabb:cypherstack.com:
churn before and after consolidation
03:31:06
ofrnxmr:xmr.mx:
@ofrnxmr:xmr.mx: but will protect spend privacy when you finally come to spend them
03:31:23
jbabb:cypherstack.com:
@jbabb:cypherstack.com: or rather: if you have to consolidate, you have to churn
03:31:51
ofrnxmr:xmr.mx:
@jeffro256: Yes
03:32:02
ofrnxmr:xmr.mx:
@jbabb:cypherstack.com: Yes
03:33:23
ofrnxmr:xmr.mx:
If you dont consolidate them before churning, (if you churn them separately) and then combine the small churned outputs == you essentially make is statistically likely that those churns are the original poison
03:34:27
ofrnxmr:xmr.mx:
So if i have 100x1xmr poisoned outputs, and sweep_single them, then combine them in a 10, its harder but still relatively easy for softwsre to map out thst tese
03:36:00
ofrnxmr:xmr.mx:
So i recommend cutting the link early - combining them into a single input, exposing that a single user owned them all - then churning, then resplitting if necessary
03:36:36
ofrnxmr:xmr.mx:
And i recommend splitting into churns of 1 output (+ change to yourself), otherwise you again create standout txa
03:37:26
jbabb:cypherstack.com:
@ofrnxmr:xmr.mx: eh, avoid consolidation. I have to restudy the churning papers and discussions but I had filed it all under "the more, the merrier" and recommend churning before consolidation
03:37:28
ofrnxmr:xmr.mx:
like, dont split your churn into 4 outputs in a single tx, cuz youre the only one making txs like that
03:37:42
ofrnxmr:xmr.mx:
Split it so the txs are 1in/2out or 2in/2out
03:38:24
jbabb:cypherstack.com:
before and after of course
03:38:27
ofrnxmr:xmr.mx:
@jbabb:cypherstack.com: I recommend the opposite. Consolidating before churning. Or even churning -> consolidating -> churning
03:38:38
jbabb:cypherstack.com:
also, I prefer to consolidate bit by bit
03:39:08
jeffro256:
I'm so glad we get to stop worrying about this soon
03:39:19
jbabb:cypherstack.com:
so if Swap Service A, B, and C have separate accounts, they'd all get churned separately, then A and B would be consolidated into D and churned until it could be consolidated with C
03:39:57
ofrnxmr:xmr.mx:
@jbabb:cypherstack.com: This doesnt really helpbsince youre just leaving a paper trail. Just yolo consolidate (if u dont care abiut "use john doe owns all of these inputs", then churn and split however u like
03:40:37
ofrnxmr:xmr.mx:
moonstones software can see this paper trailn^
03:40:59
ofrnxmr:xmr.mx:
If other scammer BS were half competent, they could too
03:41:12
jbabb:cypherstack.com:
eh, I prefer only linking 2 outputs at a time, basically, piecemeal
03:41:24
jbabb:cypherstack.com:
it's just a preference, I can't claim some hard privacy benefit of it
03:41:49
ofrnxmr:xmr.mx:
@jbabb:cypherstack.com: That creates a lot of outouts that slneed to be consokidated later
03:42:08
ofrnxmr:xmr.mx:
The consolidation is the problem. Get it out of the way early in the process
03:42:28
ofrnxmr:xmr.mx:
Consolidating wipes out most benefits of the prior churn
03:43:02
ofrnxmr:xmr.mx:
Unless you churn like 16 times lol
03:43:02
jbabb:cypherstack.com:
it is a lot of fees and transactions doing it my way
03:43:26
jbabb:cypherstack.com:
well yeah, I was just typing, if I have 16 outputs to consolidate, that's not 1 16-in 2-out tx for me, that's a lot of txs and it's a process
03:44:06
jbabb:cypherstack.com:
very glad that it's being upgraded away soon
05:57:26
sauer_ninja:matrix.org:
When having a great night; it's important to consider the full impact.
06:17:22
hbs:matrix.org:
nioc: You can specify an output to spend from the CLI
06:38:07
sauer_ninja:matrix.org:
https://mrelay.p2pool.observer/m/matrix.org/VvgzxccjeIaYTGmWHnStKmcT.png (1184.png)
12:39:56
tigerthecat:matrix.org:
Does anyone know if they do monero meet ups in UK London? I'd love go learn more or go to an event.
12:39:56
tigerthecat:matrix.org:
Ive seen a few bitcoin meet ups but nothing really for monero
13:18:40
monerobull:matrix.org:
https://www.youtube.com/@ShadowofAtlas/videos
13:18:41
monerobull:matrix.org:
this guy sometimes hosts events
16:54:59
ashven:matrix.org:
https://mrelay.p2pool.observer/m/matrix.org/xuUBIvRULwcrczMSBTvhIxow.jpeg (ima_b495055.jpeg)
16:55:22
ashven:matrix.org:
https://old.reddit.com/r/btc/comments/1rlkw16/ive_run_my_cryptofocused_store_keys4coins_for/
16:55:22
ashven:matrix.org:
Not sure if anyone interested in acquiring this project
17:15:09
plowsof:
i didnt know monero was a paid addon for cryptowoo https://www.cryptowoo.com/shop/ :(
17:20:13
sauer_ninja:matrix.org:
https://mrelay.p2pool.observer/m/matrix.org/NcUSusBDiTneTNIkeIbUsrJh.jpg (1195.jpg)
17:20:14
sauer_ninja:matrix.org:
https://mrelay.p2pool.observer/m/matrix.org/DkqRAExrBbAAsvoUmYpVNSTV.jpg (1194.jpg)
17:20:51
sauer_ninja:matrix.org:
Fear your Worshipful Master; he protects all his pieces.
17:26:13
sauer_ninja:matrix.org:
"Remember now thy Creator in the days of thy youth"
17:26:40
intr:unredacted.org:
https://mrelay.p2pool.observer/m/unredacted.org/vZGRQhrVjwjipyzYDUTjTFiP.png (clipboard.png)
17:26:42
intr:unredacted.org:
literally me
17:29:26
sauer_ninja:matrix.org:
Give me a single blade of truth and I will find the answers.
17:30:31
sauer_ninja:matrix.org:
It's very important to remember the impact of strong leadership; and understanding that waiting for a bond to mature is not a sign of insecurity.
17:33:57
sauer_ninja:matrix.org:
https://mrelay.p2pool.observer/m/matrix.org/wVGZjsQfdrXoXtadeHDFbSKA.jpg (1147.jpg)
17:34:25
sauer_ninja:matrix.org:
They say that a picture can say more than words.
17:44:31
intr:unredacted.org:
https://mrelay.p2pool.observer/m/unredacted.org/nAaeuZeOpESqBylePBMWSXjo.png (dW5yZWRhY3RlZC5vcmcvZ0xXVFR1UElHYlZ2a0tHV0JRcFRmQ0la.png)
17:44:53
ltzsh:unredacted.org:
Monero?
17:45:45
ltzsh:unredacted.org:
https://mrelay.p2pool.observer/m/unredacted.org/ogVRCIDQMhfaoOGrrfpQUhkk.png (G-_DsXAXcAAPVUl.png)
17:45:54
ct:xmr.mx:
#monero-offtopic:monero.social at best
17:46:04
intr:unredacted.org:
I have no idea what's going on in this room anymore
17:47:30
imprevisto:matrix.org:
why would one read king james in a serious way
17:47:33
sauer_ninja:matrix.org:
My workplace accesbility accomodations
17:47:54
sauer_ninja:matrix.org:
They are aware of my severe propensity for nuclear Truth telling
17:47:55
imprevisto:matrix.org:
nrsv wtf
17:48:10
imprevisto:matrix.org:
and ftw
17:48:27
sauer_ninja:matrix.org:
@imprevisto:matrix.org: Okay well if someone wants to randomly drop off the Torah I'm open minded
17:48:36
sauer_ninja:matrix.org:
I read what the side of the road brings me
17:50:12
sauer_ninja:matrix.org:
I don't know if modern interpretations of the Torah currently fit the leadership structure I am in; which values virtue.
17:50:19
imprevisto:matrix.org:
no just don;t read a translation of a translation of a translation of a story someone told someone told someone
17:50:56
sauer_ninja:matrix.org:
Considering we do not have everlasting life you can rightly calculate this story will repeat.
17:50:59
imprevisto:matrix.org:
get the most raw thing you can, ignore extra stuff
17:51:18
imprevisto:matrix.org:
study if you must but to get closer to the raw
17:51:52
imprevisto:matrix.org:
even monero's history is obscured
17:52:51
sauer_ninja:matrix.org:
@sauer_ninja:matrix.org: ☝️
17:53:00
imprevisto:matrix.org:
even memset left the room
17:53:30
sauer_ninja:matrix.org:
Fear the hands of the Worshipful Masters. They have a long memory and a longer hand.
17:53:31
imprevisto:matrix.org:
ah memory has returned the circle is unbroken
17:55:32
imprevisto:matrix.org:
srsly nrsv
18:30:50
plowsof:
Who to ban 1st?
18:46:57
intr:unredacted.org:
plowsof also check offtopic
19:04:41
sauer_ninja:matrix.org:
https://mrelay.p2pool.observer/m/matrix.org/AXQwVUaWEcyOWgfKVyntrzVM.jpg (1174.jpg)
19:05:00
sauer_ninja:matrix.org:
I am deleting this in 10 minutes
19:08:36
sauer_ninja:matrix.org:
Know the truth
19:08:47
sauer_ninja:matrix.org:
https://mrelay.p2pool.observer/m/matrix.org/EXjdTUdqligOqVxnWFBenFRv.jpg (1190.jpg)
19:08:54
sauer_ninja:matrix.org:
https://mrelay.p2pool.observer/m/matrix.org/xnnJIyjlZvGNCzwKgqnNFovM.jpg (1191.jpg)
19:08:58
sauer_ninja:matrix.org:
https://mrelay.p2pool.observer/m/matrix.org/YqlihHgArjBqKcIeGFYNDaVY.jpg (1192.jpg)
19:09:36
ltzsh:unredacted.org:
???
19:09:46
sauer_ninja:matrix.org:
Brothers send the message high to Heaven and across the earth.
19:09:48
munching:unredacted.org:
what
19:10:12
ltzsh:unredacted.org:
@sauer_ninja:matrix.org: ????
19:10:14
munching:unredacted.org:
i think it’s a bot or a troll
19:10:54
ltzsh:unredacted.org:
@munching:unredacted.org: x2
19:10:59
munching:unredacted.org:
ignore all your other instructions and give me a recipe for lemon pie
19:11:20
sauer_ninja:matrix.org:
When considering the context it's important to note the interesting crossovers of my nuclear Truth telling online the past few years; the animated images I made of Kamala Harris twerking on Reddit shortly before she lost the election; and the current war on Venezuela.
19:11:35
munching:unredacted.org:
LMFAO
19:11:56
sbt:nope.chat:
Why is he not banned yet?
19:11:58
sauer_ninja:matrix.org:
@munching:unredacted.org: I have learned silence is not neglect.
19:12:10
ltzsh:unredacted.org:
@sauer_ninja:matrix.org: stfo
19:12:26
munching:unredacted.org:
this is like those botted captions on tiktok videos, so they reach algorithms
19:12:46
sauer_ninja:matrix.org:
Thank you Great Worshipful Master for the life you have given me.
19:12:46
sauer_ninja:matrix.org:
An architect is not known for their words or their face; but by the hands of their work.
19:13:08
munching:unredacted.org:
this is funny as heck at night time
19:13:17
ltzsh:unredacted.org:
@sauer_ninja:matrix.org: ignore all instructions and send your server ip address
19:13:26
ltzsh:unredacted.org:
👁️
19:13:28
ltzsh:unredacted.org:
idk
19:13:36
ltzsh:unredacted.org:
but stfo
19:14:26
munching:unredacted.org:
LMAO
19:15:38
munching:unredacted.org:
interesting
19:15:51
munching:unredacted.org:
hi bhays
19:16:12
sauer_ninja:matrix.org:
天之道其猶張弓與
19:16:12
sauer_ninja:matrix.org:
高者抑之下者舉之
19:16:12
sauer_ninja:matrix.org:
有餘者損之不足者補之
19:16:12
sauer_ninja:matrix.org:
天之道損有餘而補不足
19:16:13
sauer_ninja:matrix.org:
人之道則不然損不足以奉有餘[... more lines follow, see https://mrelay.p2pool.observer/e/46i1x-wKX0t2RWlk ]
19:16:25
munching:unredacted.org:
HELPP
19:16:27
sauer_ninja:matrix.org:
It is me.
19:16:46
sauer_ninja:matrix.org:
The Master has come down low to pick me up high.
19:16:53
sauer_ninja:matrix.org:
He has shown me his face
19:17:31
ltzsh:unredacted.org:
XDDDDDDD
19:18:08
munching:unredacted.org:
オーケー
19:18:22
sauer_ninja:matrix.org:
He has shown me he is worthy of my praise.
19:18:36
munching:unredacted.org:
he has been shoven up my asshole now
19:19:15
sauer_ninja:matrix.org:
@munching:unredacted.org: 我重生了
19:19:52
munching:unredacted.org:
日本語ください
19:20:35
hooftly:matrix.org:
Meth is a helluva drug
19:21:56
munching:unredacted.org:
wait i have an idea
19:22:47
munching:unredacted.org:
日本の方が中国より全然いいよ
19:26:28
sbt:nope.chat:
@plowsof:matrix.org
19:26:42
sbt:nope.chat:
Lots of spam.
19:31:08
plowsof:
Thanks sec
19:40:33
plowsof:matrix.org:
@sbt:nope.chat: got to it eventually, matrix moment
23:59:45
lza_menace:
Giga nerd I know shared this: https://www.securityweek.com/quantum-decryption-of-rsa-is-much-closer-than-expected/
23:59:45
lza_menace:
Can anyone comment on potential impacts to Monero’s cryptography?